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MORAL DISTRESS—
MISUNDERSTOOD, MISAPPLIED

s an ethicist for a four-hospital
Catholic health system in Wisconsin, I do not believe we
present any uniqueness concerning the
complexity of issues addressed by our
ethics committees. In some instances
the referrals we receive for ethics consultation are circumscribed by a general
frustration or professional distress in the
level of care (or lack thereof) requested
by the patient or family in relationship to
the patient’s clinical acuity. When such
frustration or distress is identified as one
concern among many related to the conflict that warranted ethics consultation, it
is often termed “moral distress.” Given
the prevalence of this term in the bioethics literature, it is my view that “moral
distress,” as a concept, requires a reexamination in light of its original meaning
offered by Andrew Jameton in 1984.
Jameton implicitly crafted a definition
of moral distress in his book Nursing
Practice: The Ethical Issues: “…moral
distress arises when one knows the right
thing to do, but institutional constraints
make it nearly impossible to pursue the
right course of action” (Jameton, 1984).
It seems, however, that negative feelings
associated with moral distress (i.e., anger,
frustration, and the like) have been attributed to moral distress in cases where “the
right thing to do” was still in question
(Hanna, 2004). My assertion is that situations involving differing opinions about
the best (i.e., “morally right”) course of
action evoke discomfort among some
members of the health care team, and

that this discomfort is wrongly attributed
to moral distress rather than to its actual
cause—moral subjectivity.
Nurses’ Perceptions of Moral Distress
in End-of-life Decision-Making
Ellen Elpern identified situations
resulting in high levels of “moral distress” among medical intensive care unit
nurses. Nurses identified the following
six contexts as causing the greatest levels
of moral distress in both intensity and
frequency (Elpern, 2005):
1. Continue to participate in care for
hopelessly ill person who is being
sustained on a ventilator, when no
one will make a decision to “pull
the plug;”
2. Follow a family’s wishes to continue life support even though it is not
in the best interests of the patient;
3. Initiate extensive life-saving
actions when I think it only
prolongs death;
4. Follow the family’s wishes for the
patient’s care when I do not agree
with them but do so because the
hospital administration fears a
lawsuit;
5. Carry out the physician’s orders for
unnecessary tests and treatments
for terminally ill patients; and
6. Provide care that does not relieve
the patient’s suffering because the
physician fears increasing doses of
Cont. on page 2
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pain medication will cause death
(emphases added).

nurses experienced moral distress in
intensity and frequency more so than
physicians—again reflecting the same
These same themes are repeated
theme of feeling compelled to provide
throughout the literature on moral
aggressive treatments at the insistence
distress. In 1981, Davis reported on a
variety of contexts in which ethical di- of others (Delgado, et al., 2005). A
lemmas were identified by nurses—the conclusion of these three decades of
most frequent of which was “prolong- work on moral distress seems modestly
ing life with heroic measures” (Davis, summarized by Elpern (2005), who
1981). Wilkinson’s study in 1988 sug- noted: “Moral distress is a serious issue
gests the same finding, citing the high- in the workplace and deserves urgent
est occurrence of moral distress among and extended attention.”
nursing staff was related to prolongWith a nod to Elpern’s request, I
ing life and performing unnecessary
return to her research in 2005 on the
tests and treatments on terminally
frequency and intensity of the experiill patients (Wilkinson, 1987/1988).
ence of moral distress to offer some
Follow-up surveys by both Corley and analysis. In each of the six examples
Omery, et al. continued to confirm
identified by ICU nurses as an experithese findings through the 1990s, citence of moral distress, there exists
ing specific issues concerning quality
language (italicized in the examples
of life, do-not-resuscitate decisions,
above) that either necessitates definiconflicts over what is in a patient’s
tion or can only be defined in context.
best interest, and dying with dignity
Terms like “hopeless,” “best interests,”
(Corley, 1995; Corley, et al., 2005;
“extensive,” “unnecessary” or “sufferOmery, et al., 1995). Finally, Delgado ing” are subjective assessments that
et al.’s study in 2005 on the moral
require context to flesh out precisely
distress in attending physicians and
what they mean. A distinction should
nurses in adult ICU settings found that be made between a true inability of the

The Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee Network (MHECN) is a
membership organization, established by the Law and Health Care Program
at the University of Maryland School of Law. The purpose of MHECN is
to facilitate and enhance ethical reflection in all aspects of decision making
in health care settings by supporting and providing informational and
educational resources to ethics committees serving health care institutions in
the state of Maryland. The Network works to achieve this goal by:
• Serving as a resource to ethics committees as they investigate
ethical dilemmas within their institution and as they strive to assist
their institution to act consistently with its mission statement;
• Fostering communication and information sharing among Network
members;
• Providing educational programs for ethics committee members, other
healthcare providers, and members of the general public on ethical
issues in health care; and
• Conducting research to improve the functioning of ethics committees
and ultimately the care of patients in Maryland.
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nurse (or other health care provider)
to act on the patient’s behalf when not
doing so would jeopardize his or her
professional integrity, and the potential
lack of clarity and decisiveness on the
part of the nurse regarding his or her
concrete ethical obligations (Bennett,
2006).
Use of these terms as solely situated
within the definitional purview of the
nurse seems to suggest an objectivity to terms like “in the patient’s best
interests” that simply does not exist. This is not to say that health care
providers should not question whether
the clinical goals articulated by the
patient (or by extension his/her surrogate) are reasonable and/or can be
realistically achieved based on what
is clinically appropriate. Rather, the
process of evaluating what a patient
would want or what is truly in the
patient’s best interests often involves
subjective assessments about quality
of life, beliefs, and values that patients, surrogate decision-makers, and
health care providers may not share. In
those instances (e.g., following a surrogate decision-maker’s wishes to continue life support for a dying patient),
health care providers must recognize
when moral subjectivity exists, and
be helped to work through that moral
terrain without misattributing their
response to “moral distress.”
Conclusions
When examining the precise nature
of the term moral distress, the examples identified in the literature revealed
instances when there may not have
been consensus about the "right thing"
to do, and the distress caused by this
moral subjectivity was misattributed
to “moral distress.” Ethics consultants
called in to address such concerns
need to help members of the health
care team recognize that subjective
assessments of “right” and “wrong”
actions need to take into account the
patient’s perspective. Without the ability to ascertain how the patient him/

herself defined what is characterized
as the cause of moral distress for the
health care provider, it is difficult to
assess whether there are truly instances when “…one knows the right thing
to do, but institutional constraints
make it nearly impossible to pursue
the right course of action.” Rather,
it may very well be the case that the
lack of precision in understanding the
moral locus of these subjectively
value-laden terms leads to distress. I
suggest this is not “moral distress” as
defined by Jameton, but rather a discomfort with moral subjectivity.
A re-evaluation of the literature on
moral distress may therefore be warranted. A re-evaluation must clearly
distinguish between those situations
that are properly characterized as
moral distress (e.g., a patient is in
pain and the nurse is prohibited from
administering pain medication for no
good reason) and those that reveal a
health care provider’s difficulty with
moral subjectivity (e.g., a nurse disagrees with a surrogate’s decision to
prolong a dying patient’s life based on
the surrogate’s assessment of what the
patient would have wanted). Ultimately, a more precise characterization of
moral distress should be sought—that
is, a characterization of moral distress
that does not smuggle into the concept
itself anger or frustration with end-oflife decision-making that is not rightly
within the moral purview of the health
care provider.
Mark Repenshek, Ph.D.
Healthcare Ethicist
Columbia St. Mary's Health System
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
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hysicians Orders for LifeSustaining Treatment (POLST)
programs currently exist in
seven states, and are being developed
in several more states across the
country. These programs allow
persons—particularly those who are
seriously ill—to make their wishes
known regarding life-sustaining
treatments, and to have those wishes
communicated and honored across all
health care settings. A POLST form
differs from an advance directive,
such as a living will, in that it reflects
actual orders, rather than preferences
that inform a clinician’s orders
regarding life-sustaining treatments.
The primary advantage of a POLST
form is that it contains portable orders
that travel with the patient across the
continuum of care among various
health care providers. Recent studies
show that a patient’s wishes regarding
end-of-life care are carried out more
reliably when a POLST form has
been completed.
The Maryland version of the form
is called MOLST—Medical Orders
for Life-Sustaining Treatment—
because nurse practitioners can write
such orders in Maryland. In the
2011 Maryland legislative session, a
bill will be introduced to recognize
the MOLST form as a medical
order form containing a patient’s
preferences for treatment based on
the patient’s current conditions and
wishes. The MOLST form would be
honored in all health care settings,
regardless of whether the health care
provider had admitting privileges
at a particular health care facility. It
would replace the Maryland Institute
for Emergency Medical Services
Systems (MIEMSS) MIEMSS/DNR
order form and the Current LifeSustaining Treatment (LST) Options
form.
The MOLST form first requires the
practitioner to explain the authority
4 Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter

MOLST IN MARYLAND
for issuing it (for
The MOLST form would replace the current
example, based on
MIEMSS/DNR order form and the Life-Sustaining
the consent of the
Treatment (LST) Options form (formerly called the
patient). The next
section records the
“Patient’s Plan of Care” form). It meets criteria set
code status for the
forth in the POLST Paradigm.
patient (i.e., whether
Visit http://www.ohsu.edu/polst/ for more information
cardiopulmonary
about the POLST Paradigm.
resuscitation [CPR]
should be attempted Visit http://www.dhmh.state.md.us/ohcq/ for more
on scene or when
information about the Maryland MOLST form.
emergency medical
services personnel are summoned).
discharged, the patient loses capacity
Originally, a “do not resuscitate”
to make health care decisions, or
(EMS/DNR) order allowed only for
the patient changes his or her mind
palliative care. MIEMSS then revised
regarding treatments. These events
the EMS/DNR order to provide for
would trigger further review of the
an aggressive option that allows for
MOLST form.
other advanced treatments prior to
The MOLST form must be kept
arrest (Option A) and another option
in the patient’s medical record and
for more passive treatments prior
transferred with the patient. Only
to arrest (Option B). In practice,
those parts of the MOLST form that
MIEMSS discovered that patients
relate to a patient’s current treatment
with reversible conditions have
condition or preferences would need
been selecting the passive Option
to be completed. Proper use of the
B rather than the more aggressive
form would require a large, ongoing
Option A because they did not
educational effort. Toward this end,
want intubation. Thus, MIEMSS
Dr. Steven Levenson has authored
has deleted intubation as one of the
a guide on how to use the MOLST
permitted treatments in Option A,
form. The plan is to educate all
creating the current EMS/DNR A
health care providers once the bill
(Do Not Intubate—DNI) option. The
is passed by providing train-the“old” EMS/DNR Option A (with
trainer sessions, followed by training
intubation) forms that have been
conducted by health care provider
signed will still be honored by EMS
organizations.
providers.
The MOLST form was developed
The second page of the MOLST
under the auspices of a Maryland
form contains orders regarding
Governor’s Council for End of
life-sustaining treatments, including
Life Care working group led by Dr.
artificial ventilation, blood
Levenson. Other working group
transfusion, hospital transfer, medical
members include Assistant Attorney
workup, antibiotics, artificially
General Paul Ballard, Dr. Tricia
administered fluids and nutrition,
Nay, Bill Vaughan from the Office
and kidney dialysis. The intent of
of Health Care Quality, Dr. Richard
the MOLST form is to generate
Alcorta, and Assistant Attorney
consolidated orders that relate
General Sarah Sette from MIEMSS.
to current treatment issues and
The draft MOLST form, draft
preferences. Periodic review of the
guide,
and draft bill are posted on the
form is thus vitally important when
OHCQ website, at http://www.dhmh.
the patient’s condition substantially
state.md.us/ohcq/.
changes, the patient is transferred or

T

THE PHILOSOPHER'S CORNER:
THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE EFFECT

he principle of double effect
was developed by Roman
Catholic moral theologians
in the Middle Ages. It is applied to
situations in which it is impossible to
avoid all harmful action and a decision must be made about whether
one potentially harmful action is
preferable to another (Quill, Dresser,
& Brock, 1997). It is used to justify
claims that the results of an act that
would be morally wrong if it were
caused intentionally are permissible
if the “bad results” were unintended.
The principle is often cited to explain
why certain interventions at the end
of life that hasten death are morally
permissible and others are not. The
traditional formulation of this principle stipulates that the following four
conditions must be met before an act
with both good and bad (i.e., “evil”)
consequences may be morally justified:
1. The action itself must be good
or at least morally indifferent;
2. The individual must sincerely
intend only the good effect and
not the bad;
3. The bad effect cannot be the
means to the good effect; and
4. There must be a proportionately
good reason for permitting the
bad effect; that is, there must be
a favorable balance between the
good and the bad effects of the
action.
The first condition determines
whether the potential action is ever
permissible, while the second and
third conditions are used to determine whether the potential harm is
intentional or unintentional, either
as a means or as an end in itself. The
fourth condition requires the agent to
compare the net good and bad effects of the potential act to determine
which course produces an effect of

proportionally greater good (Quill, et
al., 1997).
Health care providers may appeal
to this principle in morally difficult
situations where it is not possible to
benefit a patient by an action without at the same time causing harm.
The classic example is that of the
terminally ill dying patient who is
experiencing both great pain and a
low respiratory rate. The treatment of
choice, morphine sulfate, will alleviate the pain but might also cause respiratory suppression. The clinician’s
moral duty to alleviate pain appears
to conflict with the duty to protect
and preserve life. An argument that
the clinician is justified in administering morphine, even if it hastens
the patient’s death, is based on the
following tenets of the principle of
double effect:
1. The action of giving morphine
is itself morally indifferent.
2. The intended effect is to relieve
the pain, not to suppress the
respirations.
3. Respiratory suppression is not
the means by which the pain
relief is obtained.
4. The relief of pain and the
related reduction of suffering
combine to provide a sufficiently important reason, or proportionately greater good than the
harm that is incurred—respiratory depression and hastened
death (Schwarz, 2004).
There are some who question the
clinical usefulness of this principle
as a guide to ethical decision making
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2008). In
particular, some clinical experts in
palliative care challenge the purported “double effect” of opiate use
in terminally ill patients, and describe
the likelihood of a secondarily as-

sociated hastened death as an “over
blown myth” (Manfredi, Morrison, &
Meier, 1998). Indeed, some studies
have shown that opioids do not hasten
death in terminally ill patients, particularly in patients who are not opioid
naïve, due to acquisition of tolerance
to an opioid’s respiratory depressant effects (Bakker, Jansen, Lima
& Kompanje, 2008; Portenoy et al.,
2006). Others caution that “using the
[principle of double effect] to justify
using opioids to treat pain in dying
patients contributes to the belief in
the double effect of pain medication,
which in turn leads to fear of hastening death and the undertreatment of
pain” (Fohr, 1998, p. 316).
Experienced palliative care
practitioners recognize that death
sometimes occurs secondarily as
an unintended though foreseen side
effect of opioids used to manage
certain refractory symptoms in dying
patients, particularly opioid-naïve
patients (e.g., in terminal ventilator
weaning). Despite the clear legal and
moral consensus supporting the appropriateness of such interventions,
when a patient dies soon after receiving a dose of opioid, it can be upsetting to the person who administered
that last dose. The fear of hastening
death has been identified as a primary
reason why nurses may be reluctant
to provide adequate pain relief to suffering patients (Solomon et al., 1993).
Another concern among critics of
applying this principle is depiction of
death as being an “evil” to be avoided. When careful titration of medication can relieve symptoms without
hastening death, it is not ethically justifiable to forego titration and hasten
death. However, not all patients who
are dying view death as an evil to be
avoided. Magnusson (2006, p. 567)
Cont. on page 6
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Double Effect
Cont. from page 5
suggests an alternative to the principle
of double effect, as summarized here:
In circumstances where the provision of symptom relief is highly
likely or indeed certain to shorten
a patient’s life, it is appropriate to
impute to the physician an intention to hasten death. This does
not mean that law or medical
ethics is committed to acknowledging euthanasia as a routine
part of palliative care: it is the
surreptitious, undeclared practice
of euthanasia that justifies the
critique of conventional accounts
of palliative care. It is, however,
to recognize that physicians must
sometimes face the devil’s choice:
a choice, that is, between relieving
suffering and hastening death in
circumstances where there is no
third alternative and where it is
not possible not to choose.
The commonality to both of these
methods of justifying hastening death
to alleviate suffering is that measures
to alleviate suffering are proportionate
(i.e., palliative medications are titrated
to relieve symptoms), and that there is
no other alternative available.

The above article was adapted from
the book chapter: Tarzian, AJ &
Schwarz, JK (2010). Ethical Aspects
of Palliative Care. In M Matzo & D
Sherman’s Palliative Care Nursing:
Quality Care to the End of Life. New
York: Springer.
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ERRATUM
In the Summer, 2010 issue of the Newsletter, in the article “Patients without Proxies—What’s Happening in Other
States?”, we mistakenly referred to University Hospitals Case Medical Center in Cleveland, Ohio as “Case Western Reserve Hospital.” Our apologies to Cynthia Griggins, PhD, MA, Co-Director of the Clinical Ethics Service at
University Hospitals Case Medical Center and UHCMC staff for this error.
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CASE PRESENTATION

O

ne of the regular features of this
Newsletter is the presentation
of a case considered by an ethics
committee and an analysis of the
ethical issues involved. Readers are
both encouraged to comment on the
case or analysis and to submit other
cases that their ethics committee has
dealt with. In all cases, identifying
information about patients and others
in the case should only be provided
with the permission of the patient.
Unless otherwise indicated, our policy
is not to identify the submitter or
institution. We may also change facts
to protect confidentiality. Cases and
comments should be sent to MHECN@
law.umaryland.edu, or MHECN, Law
& Health Care Program, University
of Maryland School of Law, 500 W.
Baltimore St., Baltimore, MD 21201.

CASE FROM A NICU

B

aby Boy Smith is a 2400 gram
male infant born at 34 weeks
gestation at a small community
hospital. His mother is 33 years old,
with three other children. Her pregnancy was unremarkable, although
she had late prenatal care. The mom
reported having a normal prenatal
ultrasound at approximately 20 weeks.
When she presented in pre-term labor,
oligohydramnios (low amniotic fluid)
was noted on ultrasound. The infant
was delivered vaginally, and required
intubation in the delivery room due
to poor respiratory effort. Multiple
anomalies including bilateral cleft
lip and palate, micropthalmia (small
eyes), talipes equinovarus (club foot),
microcephaly (small head circumference) and ruptured omphalocele (intestines protruding through belly button)
were noted at delivery. The infant was
transferred to a tertiary care NICU. An
echocardiogram following admission
revealed large atrial and ventricular
septal defects (heart abnormalities).
A head ultrasound was reported as
normal. On the day of admission, he

was brought to the operating room for
primary repair of the omphalocele. He
remained intubated postoperatively,
and became critically ill with pulmonary hypertension. Rapid FISH testing
confirmed suspected Trisomy 13, a
genetic disorder in which a person has
three copies of genetic material from
chromosome 13, instead of the usual
two copies.
Following surgery and FISH results,
the parents met with the neonatologist,
geneticist, and pediatric cardiologist
to discuss the baby’s diagnosis and
prognosis and to develop plans for his
care. Recommendations for palliative care were made to the family, and
withdrawal of life support was offered.
The parents, in particular the baby’s
father, expressed mistrust in the medical system based on past experiences.
The parents discussed strong spiritual
beliefs that their baby’s future was in
the hands of God, whose work was
being done by the medical team. The
parents expressed understanding that
their baby should be comfortable and
without pain, but felt that life support
should be continued and escalated as
needed to keep their son alive. The
parents’ review of information and
case reports on the internet promised
hope for a future quality of life for
their son that was different from what
the medical team described. The parents also expressed concern that there
was insufficient medical support near
their small town home to adequately
care for their son there. They preferred
hospitalization in the NICU for their
son until he required minimal support
and care.
The baby’s cardiorespiratory status
improved over the first 48 hours of life
with high frequency ventilation and
nitric oxide, and he was weaned to
minimal ventilator support. Over the
next two months, he failed multiple
attempts at extubation due to significant oropharyngeal secretions and

worsening respiratory distress when
off the ventilator. He remained orally
intubated on the ventilator, on minimal
settings. He developed evidence of
pituitary dysfunction with hypoglycemia, metabolic acidosis, and electrolyte instability requiring intravenous
(IV) nutrition and fluids in addition to
enteral feedings to maintain normal
fluid and electrolyte balance. Weight
gain was slow but consistent, with no
increase in head circumference from
birth to 2 months of life. He was maintained on oral morphine for sedation
and pain control.
There were multiple family meetings following the time of diagnosis.
The parents maintained their position that the medical team should
proceed with all life extending care,
and their visits became less frequent.
The medical team discussed, but did
not recommend, a tracheostomy and
gastrostomy tube placement as a next
step in the care of infants with this
degree of illness. The parents declined
tracheostomy and gastrostomy placement. They stated on several occasions that further invasive procedures
were not in the best interest of their
child, but they consistently rejected an
end-of-life palliative care approach.
The father was at times angry both at
the bedside and in family meetings,
and vocalized his desire to avoid any
further conversations about palliative
care, a DNR order, and non-escalation of treatment. The medical team
became increasingly uncomfortable
giving what they considered to be
medically inappropriate therapy, given
the diagnosis of Trisomy 13 and the
patient’s hospital course during the
first few months of life. The medical
team felt that escalation of treatment
and surgical procedures to prolong life
such as tracheostomy were not in the
best interest of the patient and, at this
point, would only prolong pain and
Cont. on page 8
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Case Presentation
Cont. from page 7
suffering. They questioned the parents’ ability to make decisions in the
best interest of their child. An ethics
consultation was requested to consider
whether CPR could be withheld or the
ventilator withdrawn based on medical
ineffectiveness criteria.

COMMENTS FROM
A NEONATOLOGIST &
ETHICS COMMITTEE
MEMBER

A

nticipating the birth of a baby
is often a wonderful event for
families. Baby gift registries,
painting the nursery, choosing daycare
providers, planning dates for maternity
leave, all events of joyful preparation
for a beautiful, healthy infant. Few
families have life experiences that
prepare them for the possibility that
their infant could be born with a lifethreatening illness or could die before
ever leaving the hospital. In this case,
the Smith family experienced an uneventful pregnancy and their prenatal
testing was reassuring. There was no
warning that anything might be wrong.
When labor occurs prematurely, parents are particularly discombobulated,
with urgent juggling of jobs, childcare,
and finances.
It is no surprise that parents are
completely blindsided when their baby
is born with serious medical problems.
It is, in fact, predictable. On the other
hand, obstetrical and neonatal teams
are prepared for such unexpected
tragedies and have a duty to anticipate
the emotional, psychological, spiritual
and social needs of families in these
scenarios. Services that should be
available include personnel trained in
how to appropriately deliver bad news,
interdisciplinary teams who can immediately address families’ needs beyond
medical information, and anticipatory
guidance for families so that they can
brace themselves for this crisis.
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curred in this case from the moment
of birth, long before the issue of a
trachesotomy was raised or an Ethics
Consultation requested. The Smith
family—and the obstetricians—had no
warning that the newborn would have
a life-threatening condition. He was
urgently transferred to a regional hospital, a transfer that separates infants
from their parents and often involves
hours of commuting for the family. Whether to transfer a baby with
suspected Trisomy 13 to a regional
hospital may arguably not be in the
best interest of the infant or family.
Palliative care from the moment of
birth would be another option. Parent
surprise about the infant’s condition
and community physician discomfort with making complex diagnoses
or limiting interventions often prevent early consideration of palliative
care. This may have led to Baby boy
Smith’s transport in this case.
The neonatologists at the regional
hospital seem also to have been
taken by surprise by the diagnosis of
Trisomy 13, a condition which has a
median survival time of 7-10 days and
a 95% mortality in infancy (Rasmussen SA Peds 2003). Gastroschisis
repair was completed on the first day
of life, presumably prior to confirming
the important diagnosis of the life-limiting syndrome, and likely when the
mother was still an inpatient at another
hospital. We do not know if the decision to perform gastroschisis repair—a
procedure which is often not emergent—was weighed against the option
to provide comfort care only for this
infant with a severe genetic syndrome.
We do know that the medical team did
not request an Ethics Consultation at
that time.
Neither the decision for neonatal
transport nor the decision for gastroschisis repair may have been presented
to the family as ethically complex
options. Physicians are profession-

ally obligated to provide medical
treatment to newborns when diagnostic and prognostic uncertainty is
very high, as it may have been in the
first days of this case. But they feel
similarly ethically obligated to delay
non-emergent surgeries when a severe,
life-limiting genetic syndrome is part
of the differential diagnosis. When
this kind of thoughtful analysis and
clear communication with the family
does not occur, the family often finds
it difficult to reconcile with the medical team’s threshold between “doing
for” and “doing to.” Parent mistrust of
physicians, identified as an important
barrier in this case, is only enhanced
when physicians initiate a complex
treatment course and then quickly ask
parents’ permission to abandon it.
That parents find comfort and hope
in their religious beliefs is common
during their child’s critical illness
(Boss, 2008; Robinson, 2006). The
family in this case indicated that
they believed their baby’s care was
in God’s hands; it is unclear how the
medical team explored the sources and
boundaries of this belief, or whether
a chaplain was called to navigate
physician-family conversations about
suffering, hope, and quality of life. A
time-limited trial of intensive care,
with a plan to allow natural death to
occur barring substantial improvement, can be acceptable to some families with similar belief systems.
The medical team experienced moral
distress in their care of the Smith family, particularly when it seemed that
this family who “wanted everything
done” for their son, did not want him
to come home. Apparently both the
parents and the medical team agreed
that a tracheostomy and g-tube were
not in the infant’s best interest, and
the medical team should feel good
about their ability to align these goals.
The conflict revolves around how the
infant is going to die: the medical team

wishes to withdraw life support now,
and the parents want the infant to continue to live in the NICU indefinitely.
Staff moral distress, which often precipitates Ethics Consultation, requires
direct acknowledgment and intervention by leadership. It appears that
in this case, moral distress was only
aggravated by physicians who offered
CPR to the parents. Limiting painful
procedures, maximizing treatment of
pain and agitation, helping to engage
the family during their visits in the
NICU, and a plan to forgo medically
ineffective surgeries, reintubations, or
CPR attempts, is an ethically defensible path. This could promote infant
quality of life, offer more time for the
family to bond and grieve, and could
diminish staff distress.
That this case is presented with extensive information about the family’s
goals and motivations—but minimal
information about the medical team’s
personalities or motivations—serves
as a reminder that such “difficult”
cases are often viewed as isolated
problems with particular families.
Many of these “difficult” issues are
predictable system problems that occur
when communication and navigation
of ethically complex cases is not routinely emphasized in medical training,
maintenance of board certification, or
career advancement. Ethics consultations are generally called when prolonged clinical scenarios have reached
a crisis of communication breakdown
and dysfunction. The meaningful impact that such crisis consultations can
have on family outcomes and future
physician decision-making in similar
scenarios is unclear.
Renee Boss, M.D., M.H.S.
Assistant Professor,
Division of Neonatology
Johns Hopkins School of Medicine
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COMMENTS FROM
A NURSE ETHICIST

P

arents think about their
responsibilities as parents which
includes not just caring for and
about their new baby, but also a duty
to support him and do what is best for
him. In the NICU, parents are forced
to share their parenting responsibilities
with members of the health care
team. The lack of trust between the
parents and the medical team is in
many ways the central issue of this
case. Without trust, parents will not
believe the team respects them and
may not believe what the team says,
as is evident by these parents’ hopes
for a better future based on what they
have read on the internet. The parents
have acknowledged limits to the
interventions they feel their son should
endure, namely the tracheostomy and
gastrostomy tube. When the team
questions the parents’ ability to make
decisions in the best interests of their
son, it is evidence that the team does
not trust the parents any more than the
parents trust them.
When they trust health care
providers, parents are more able to
accept information from them. Parents
interpret one meaning about the baby's
condition based on what they see, and
that meaning in this case seems to be
contradicted by the information from
providers, which represents a different
interpretation of the baby’s condition.
Parents struggle with their hopes for
a better future for their son and the

reality of his condition in the NICU.
In a sense, there is a reality they want
juxtaposed against a reality the health
care team believes they must accept.
In fact, the parents were given a grim
prognosis early on in this little boy’s
life, and yet thanks to technology
and the good work of the health care
team, he is still alive two months later.
Why would any caring parent give
permission to stop treatment when
clearly it has allowed their son to live?
While physicians who believe a
treatment is ineffective may have
the legal authority in Maryland to
withhold procedures, including CPR,
in this case, such an approach would
reinforce the parents’ perceptions that
physicians cannot be trusted. Yet
the mounting moral distress of the
professional caregivers cannot be
ignored. Not only do physicians and
nurses in particular have to witness
the suffering of this infant, they bear
the burden of providing on-going
care. Routine medical care for this
infant involves daily interventions
that are painful and uncomfortable
with no real expectation that those
interventions will change the outcome
for this infant, namely that he cannot
live outside the ICU and his complex
constellation of anomalies virtually
guarantees that he will die before
ever being stable enough to return to
a neonatal unit closer to where the
parents live, let alone for them to care
for him at home.
The central dilemma in this case is
how to reconcile the reality that the
parents have mutually inconsistent
goals – they wish their son to live yet
believe placement of a tracheostomy
is not in his best interests, and yet in
order for him to live he needs a more
stable airway. Forcing the parents
to consider a DNR approach, or
comfort care only, in the absence of
any success at getting them to trust
the team perpetuates the illusion that
the parents have a choice, when in
reality their choice is ultimately not
about continuing treatment, but about
Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter 9
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planning for how they want their son
to die. Constantly asking parents to
consider a choice where no real choice
exists would be confusing for anyone,
let alone parents who do not trust you.
Parents need to believe that
physicians present options of limiting
treatment because they are sincere and
compassionate, basically that they care
about the baby and the baby’s family.
Anger and frustration on the part of
the health care team do not convey
caring. Demonstrations of grief or
sadness on the part of providers could
send a powerful message to parents,
namely, that the doctors and nurses
genuinely care about their son. Trust
inspired by a caring context will
promote these parents’ confidence
in the information and the plan for
the baby. Rather than ask repeatedly
about DNR and referring to the plan
as end of life care, a more useful
approach might be to not ask explicitly
for their permission but lay out a plan
for extubation and no reintubation.
Rather than DNR, health care
providers should discuss why
extubation to CPAP, for instance,
is a step toward one of their stated
goals (i.e., getting him closer to
home) and then discuss why putting
the endotracheal tube back is not
consistent with the overall goal for
him. Instead of talking about what
will not be done, focus on what will be
done. Constantly offering the parents
a choice or seeking their permission
implies a choice when in this case
there is no real choice about saving
this little boy’s life.
It is ethically defensible to extubate
with a plan not to re-intubate. It is
based on the burden of intubation and
the standards of care for neonates.
Refusal of a tracheostomy means the
parents are in effect saying if he needs
a tracheostomy to live, the burden is
too great. For health care providers
10 Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter

to keep hammering away and asking
them to agree to a DNR order puts an
unnecessary burden on the parents.
They are making their wishes clear
and it is up to the health care team to
support them and explain what their
choice means. The biggest challenge
is to give parents the feeling of
control, of the sense of their making a
parental decision without asking them
to make a medical decision about the
efficacy of any given treatment.
Language is crucial. If the baby has
respiratory distress after extubation
(do not say “fails extubation”) then the
team will provide comfort measures
to ease the discomfort and work of
breathing. The baby will continue to
receive care and attention from the
doctors and nurses, but addressing
any respiratory distress cannot include
replacing the endotracheal tube.
Rather than say the team will not
resuscitate the baby, the team should
emphasize that if the baby deteriorates,
they will allow a natural death.
It is crucial in this case, if possible,
to avoid a resuscitation scene. To
make a plan with the parents to be
present for extubation with family
and staff there to support them and
reassure them that their son will be
comfortable and that the team will be
there to care for their son, but not to
put him back on the ventilator. If the
baby deteriorates to the point where
he meets the criteria for resuscitation,
physicians may and in this case
they have an obligation to exercise
their clinical judgment and stop a
resuscitation when they feel it is not
achieving the goal. The team in this
case should not have to “prove” a
resuscitation will not work. One of
the challenges in this case is to prepare
the nurses for what to do when the
patient meets criteria for CPR. That
is a challenge because in the neonatal
setting, expert practitioners are trained

to intervene to prevent the code from
happening and in effect begin an ICU
resuscitation before the dramatic, TVstyle resuscitation is needed.
Members of the health care team
need assistance from ethics and
palliative care to reframe their
thinking about actions. To be a good
ICU nurse or physician means to
prevent the need for resuscitation. In
this case, to be a good ICU nurse and
physician may be to allow the baby’s
condition to deteriorate to where he
meets resuscitation criteria and then
gently, carefully and skillfully support
him without intervening to stop nature
from taking its course.
Ethicists debate appropriate theories
and models to use to resolve ethical
dilemmas such as the ones faced by
the parents and health care providers
in this case. Parents do not identify
ethical theories or models that are
helpful to them as they struggle to
make meaningful choices in the face
of uncertainty, suffering and loss. The
parents in this case do not need help
with decision making. They need help
feeling they are good parents even as
their baby dies in the NICU. They
deserve respect as parents.
Lucia Wocial, RN, PhD
Nurse Ethicist
Clarian Health
Indianapolis, IN

JANUARY

CALENDAR OF EVENTS

11

(12-1:30 PM) Tony Black, MD, Sheila Hutzler-Rives Memorial Lecture, Berman Institute of Bioethics Seminar Series, 615 N. Wolfe St., Baltimore, MD, W3008. For more information, visit http://www.
bioethicsinstitute.org/.

11

(12-1:30 PM) David Brendel, MD, PhD, “ScattergoodEthics Program” lunch presentation. Penn Center
for Bioethics, 3401 Market Street, Room 321, Philadelphia, PA. RSVP to: spaebh@mail.med.upenn.
edu. Call 215-898-7136 for more information. Also visit http://www.scattergoodethics.org/.

14

(8:15 PM) The Value of Life, lecture by Mr. S. Ramachandran, St. John’s College, Francis Scott Key
Auditorium, Annapolis, MD. For more information, call 410-626-2539.

21

(8:15 PM) Wealth, Virtue and Corruption: Adam Smith's Moral Philosophy, lecture by Mr. Lauren
Brubaker. St. John’s College, Francis Scott Key Auditorium, Annapolis, MD. For more information,
call 410-626-2539.

FEBRUARY
10

(5-7 PM) “Health Care Disparities and Health Care Reform,” Professor Emeritus Frank McClellan
from Temple University Beasley School of Law. Part of the Health Law Reform Speaker Series at the
University of Maryland School of Law, 500 W. Baltimore St., Ceremonial Court Room (160E). Talk
followed by reception. Contact: Virginia Rowthorn (vrowthorn@law.umaryland.edu).

14

(12-1:30 PM) Jeffrey Kahn, PhD, MPH, Berman Institute of Bioethics Seminar Series, 615 N. Wolfe
St., Baltimore, MD, W3008. For more information, visit http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/.

28

Managing Electronic Communications in Professional Practice: Emerging Ethical Challenges and RiskManagement Implications. Workshop presenter Frederic Reamer, Ph.D. Rhode Island College School
of Social Work, Mt. Washington Conference Center, 5801 Smith Ave., Suite 1100, Baltimore, MD. For
questions, contact Linda Friend at 443-923-2802.

Feb. 28Mar.1 The Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues meeting (open to the public). For information on location, webcast, and to obtain transcripts, visit http://www.bioethics.gov/meetings/.
MARCH
5

Valuing Lives, a one-day conference in New York, NY. Contact Ben Sachs for more information:
sachs@nyu.edu, 212-992-8686.

18-20 Bioethics—More Personal or More Global? National Undergraduate Bioethics Conference at Duke
University, Durham, North Carolina.
31

(5-7 PM) “Health Care and Cost Containment.” Health Law Reform Speaker Series at the University of
Maryland School of Law, 500 W. Baltimore St., Ceremonial Court Room (160E). Talk followed by
reception. Contact: Virginia Rowthorn (vrowthorn@law.umaryland.edu).
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